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ABSTRACT
This short essay argues that the sometimes fetishistic desire on the part
of progressive intellectual property scholars to defend fair use is at odds
with racial justice. Through a rereading of landmark fair use cases using
tools drawing from Critical Race Intellectual Property (“CRTIP”), it
contends that scholars, lawyers, judges, practitioners, and activists would
be well served by focusing on how fair use remains grounded in whiteness
as (intellectual) property. It argues for doing so by rethinking the purpose
of the Copyright Act of 1976 to be inclusive of Black, Brown, and
Indigenous authors.
When The 2 Live Crew (“2 Live Crew”) triumphed in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose (1994), a copyright case that turned on whether their song
“Pretty Woman” infringed on Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman,” many
celebrated the victory for its contributions to fair use jurisprudence in the
United States, 1 as well as its protection of a then emerging and now
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omnipresent musical form: hip hop. 2 The “transformativeness” standard
that the Supreme Court adopted in finding the group’s parody of “Oh
Pretty Woman” to be fair use appeared to be full of potential, particularly
with respect to radically innovative sample based music and art. After all,
a mere three years earlier, in Warner Bros., Inc. v. Grand Upright Music
(1991), Biz Markie had lost his battle claiming that his use of unlicensed
samples was fair use. 3 “Thou shalt not steal,”4 Judge Duffy wrote,
breaking new ground by connecting copyright violations to criminality
and morality. 5 Never before had copyright infringement been treated as an
act of theft that justified criminal prosecution.6 This call for the
criminalization of copyright infringement emerged in tandem with the rise
of racist fear of crime rhetorics and the weaponization of obscenity against
music and art. 7 Black masculinity, compulsive theft, and hip hop were
1. See e.g. Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero:
A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CAL. L. REV. 597626.
2. Kimberle Crenshaw, Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism and
2 Live Crew, THE BOSTON REVIEW (1991), http://bostonreview.net/race-gendersexuality/kimberle-w-crenshaw-beyond-racism-and-misogyny [https://perma.cc/
6EZW-PNYE].
3. Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
4. Id. at 183.
5. Rebecca Tushnet, in calling for “epistemological humility” with respect
to fair use, once observed that: “the future of fair use as a formal doctrine in the
United States depends on whether judges act like bad reviewers on Amazon.com,
or whether they behave differently in interpreting challenged works than they do
in almost every other aspect of judging.” Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad
Reviewers: Fair Use and Epistemological Humility, 25 LAW AND LITERATURE
20–32 (2013). In Grand Upright Music and since, judges have revealed
themselves to be extremely bad reviewers of Black artistic works.
6. See e.g. Rudy Scott Jr. Hernandez, I’m Talking about S-S-Sampling
Records: A Glimpse into Digital Sampling, Copyright Law, and the Grand
Upright Case Comment, 1 FLA. ENT. ART & SPORT L.J. 21–24 (1993) writing that
"prior to the Grand Upright decision, all suits had either been dismissed or settled
before trial.") Id. at 21.
7. For a discussion of these attempts at criminalizing rap and hip hop and
using lyrics as proof in court cases, see e.g. Anne L. Clark, Nasty as they Wanna
Be: Popular Music on Trial, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1481–1531 (1990); Donald F.
Tibbs, From Black Power to Hip Hop: Discussing Race, Policing, and the Fourth
Amendment through the War on Paradigm War On: The Fallout of Declaring
War on Social Issues, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 47–80 (2012); Erin Lutes,
James Purdon & Henry F. Fradella, When Music Takes the Stand: A Content
Analysis of How Courts Use and Misuse Rap Lyrics in Criminal Cases, 46 AM. J.
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treated as mutually constitutive categories requiring harsh retributive
legal punishment and even censorship. Grand Upright Music was only one
of many manifestations of the ferocious racialized culture war that was
unfolding in the moment. Over the 1980s and 1990s, the Parent’s Music
Resource Center (“PMRC”), led by Democratic Second Lady Tipper Gore
and other well-known politicos, organized a full scale attack on hip hop,
deeming it threatening to the nation’s (white) suburban youth. 8 As Luther
Campbell explained in an interview on C-Span “a lot of these right wing
organizations, uh, start like picking the album apart…and then they started
suing.”9 President Bill Clinton’s response to Sista Souljah’s frustrated
remarks about anti-Black police violence echoed the refrains of the
PMRC, demonstrating that even allegedly progressive Democrats
frequently embraced Reagan-esque “Tough on Crime” language instead
of empathy in responding to the nation’s race crisis and Black artistic
responses to it. 10
In this context, 2 Live Crew’s win in the Supreme Court appeared to
be a radical departure from the nation’s antiblackness, one that even
critiqued the “white bread original” 11 that Orbison penned. Yet
transformativeness has not lived up to its potential as a mechanism for
protecting innovative Black musical practices or encouraging the
acceptance of sampling culture.12 The broad reading of fair use that legal
scholars hoped would emerge from Campbell has been supplanted by
deeply racialized and capitalist licensing fees, as well as narrow readings

CRIM. L. 77-132 (2019); see also BRYAN J. MCCANN, THE MARK OF
CRIMINALITY: RHETORIC, RACE, AND GANGSTA RAP IN THE WAR-ON-CRIME ERA
(2017).
8. Id.
9. America and the Courts, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., C-SPAN
(November 6, 1993), https://www.c-span.org/video/?52141-1/campbell-v-acuffrose-music-inc [https://perma.cc/JGZ5-NGF2].
10. Adam Howard, Sistah Souljah Compares Clinton to Slave Master’s Wife,
MSNBC (November 13, 2015) (explaining that “Souljah gave a Washington Post
interview in the aftermath of the Los Angeles riots, in which she advocated killing
white people. Clinton rebuked her publicly in front of a predominately black
audience, comparing her to ex-KKK leader David Duke, in what was widely seen
as a successful attempt to portray himself as a moderate Democrat who would not
play nice with traditional liberal interest groups.”).
11. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
12. The Sixth Circuit’s admonition to N.W.A. to “[g]et a license or do not
sample” indicates as much. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d
647, 657 (6th Cir. 2004).
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of fair use. 13 As Peter DiCola and Kembrew McLeod demonstrate, these
licensing fees would have made the production of some of the world’s
most highly regarded hip hop albums financially impossible.14 Moreover,
as Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt has pointed out, these licensing fees do not
primarily benefit the musician – if the musician even owns the music in
question. She explains that “many sample licensing fees are extracted from
sampling artist’s royalties in order to flow from one department at a
corporation to another, essentially consolidating profit for the corporation
at the expense of the sampler, with small portions eventually flowing to
the artists whose works were sampled.” 15 The “royalties” that she speaks
of are earned through the monetization of the musical compositions and
sound recordings, the rights to which are independent and assignable.
Because music publishers, usually record companies and hedge funds,
tend to accumulate large catalogues of sound recordings, a sizable
percentage of royalties flow to them. Artists who sample must, in a post
Grand Upright Music world, pay licensing fees to use samples of music in
new artistic works. These licensing fees, the lion’s share of which
generally go to music publishers, come out of the royalties that artists who
sample will earn from their new music. This extractive approach to
sampling not only limits creativity, it punishes Black artists who pioneered
one of the most lucrative forms of music in existence today. In addition to
the economic issues it produces, the United States’ licensing scheme, i.e.
a practice that emerged due to the alleged bad faith of one musician, makes
it all too easy to reproduce the deeply racialized and extractive Grand
Upright Music framework that presumes that those who sampled without
a license are criminal bad actors. While it’s not clear why defendants in
musical copyright cases have opted for what Edward Lee calls “fair use
avoidance,” 16 the result is that very little case law suggests that the defense
is productive for racial justice. In short, fair use has not offered the panacea
13. The test for fair use is outlined in the Copyright Act. Courts balance four
factors – the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work,
the amount and substantiality of the portion of the copyrighted work used, and the
effect of the use on the market for the underlying work. 17 USC § 107.
14. KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW
AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING (2011).
15. Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Copyright’s One-Way Racial Appropriation
Ratchet, 53 UC DAVIS L. REV. 591–662, 636 (2019). For instance, George Clinton
has vocally contested Bridgeport Music’s control over his catalog. This parallel
question of ownership of master records points to a need to ask who benefits from
fair use.
16. Edward Lee, Fair Use Avoidance in Music Cases, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1873–
1932 (2018).
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for musicians, particularly Black ones, that some had hoped post AcuffRose – or even a practical outlet through which they can creatively engage
with existing artistic works. Some of this issue is rooted in culturally
distinct orientations to creativity. 17 The extension of this argument that I
will focus on here is that fair use is an inadequate, even counterproductive,
tool for achieving racial equality. As such, progressive intellectual
property scholars would be wise to invest their efforts in locating other
paths through which to support Black musicians in making, protecting, and
monetizing their music, especially if samples of existing music are
involved.
This short essay contends that, while rewriting, remixing, and
sampling known and unknown artistic works produces invaluable
conversation within hegemonic popular cultural contexts, scholars and
activists invested in protecting such works have become conceptually over
reliant on fair use, particularly where Black musical innovation is
concerned. The belief in fair use sometimes takes a fantasy turn, in which
the legal doctrine is imagined to have powers beyond those that it has been
empirically proven to possess. A great deal has been written about the
possibilities and problems with the fair use doctrine, some of which this
essay will consider in greater detail later in short order. However, the part
of the debate that the essay focuses on relates to the fair use doctrine’s
practical and theoretical ability to address problems of musical racial
justice, what Kevin J. Greene calls the “mass appropriation” 18 of the
artistic works of Black musicians. Given the now abundant historical
evidence of the use of contractual extraction and performative
appropriation to steal the musical works of Black artists, fair use cannot
provide the path out; it may not even be able to provide a path out. To
quote Malcolm X: “One is a wolf, the other is a fox. No matter what they’ll
both eat you.”19 That is to say that just as (white) music industry executives
17. As David Hesmondhalgh puts it: “[Anglo-American copyright law]
protects what it calls ‘original’ works against unauthorized copying (among other
activities), whereas [African American and indigenous musical cultures involve]
copying from another work to produce a ‘derivative’ product, raising issues of
infringement of copyrights in both composition and sound recording.” David
Hesmondhalgh, Digital Sampling and Cultural Inequality, 15 SOCIAL & LEGAL
STUDIES 53–75 (2006).
18. Kevin J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the
Debate Over African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
1179–1227 (2008).
19. Malcolm X at Columbia University, Malcolm X (November 20, 1963),
http://malcolmxfiles.blogspot.com/2013/06/columbia-university-november-201963.html [https://perma.cc/R32M-BPTH].
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could not be trusted to ethically compensate Black artists, (white) judges
cannot be trusted to ethically remedy the harms that those music industry
executives produced. 20 Addressing this reality is necessary. Part I of the
essay, “Hip Hop, Sampling, and the Recognition of Black Brilliance”
demonstrates why hip hop and sampling are, now more than ever, central
to the legibility and recognition of Black brilliance. Part II “The Not So
Promised Land of Fair Use,” examines how and when fair use has failed
to radically alter copyright practice. Part III “Reimagining the Legal
Landscape of Race and Fair Use through Purpose,” draws on
contemporary conversations about race to encourage scholars, lawyers,
and judges to rethink their readings of the purpose of the Copyright Clause
in a manner consistent with evolving norms of social justice, in the music
industry and in public culture writ large.
I. HIP HOP, SAMPLING, AND THE RECOGNITION OF BLACK BRILLIANCE AS
ANTIRACIST PRAXIS

Hip hop, according to the Smithsonian’s press kit for its new reader
on the subject, is “a musical, political and social movement born more than
40 years ago that’s become a global phenomenon in influencing every
corner of our lives, from music and fashion to art and politics.” Beginning
in the late 1970s in the Bronx, hip hop emerged as an increasingly coherent
set of subcultural practices among Black and Latinx youth. As Emmett G.
Price III outlines in Hip Hop Culture, it was comprised of the DJ, graffiti,
the b-boy or b-girl, and the MC. 21 Kool Herc, Grandmaster Flash, and
Grand Wizard Theodore were the DJs who pioneered the foundations of
digital sampling, through analogue production of “breakbeats,” “mixing,”
and “scratching.” 22 At the same time, visual artists tagged the urban
landscape around them, in protest and rebellion, and b-boys and b-girls
danced the night away while MCs rapped in increasingly impressive
ways. 23 With the entrance of NWA, Public Enemy, and Afrika Bambaataa
on the scene, protesting racist policies and policing as well as gaining
“knowledge, culture, and overstanding” became important elements of hip

20. Ian Haney López’s pathbreaking work discusses how “the law” is not a
monolithic entity but a culturally and rhetorically constructed one, in which
individual actors have the power to produce race. Grand Upright Music is an
example of this. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION
OF RACE (1997).
21. EMMETT GEORGE PRICE & JORGE IBER, HIP HOP CULTURE (2006).
22. Id. at 21-28.
23. Id. at 28-37.
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hop culture. 24 By the 1990s and 2000s, hip hop had established itself as
Black and Brown music and culture, that emerged from material
conditions intended to subordinate and oppress people of color. 25 It grew
out of oppression, only to be disciplined by moral panics and legal systems
that sought to rein it in. Yet, hip hop found unlikely audiences in white
suburban households, facilitating the utter backlash that Campbell
described. I want to emphasize here, as Tricia Rose first did in her book,
Black Noise, that hip hop was, definitionally, a music and culture of
brilliance and innovation. 26 It emerged through the radical remaking of
“white” music, which was in truth a retooling of Black sonic cultures, such
as ragtime, blues, jazz, and rock.27 This history, which is now essentially
canonical amongst Gen Xers and Millennials, demonstrates the relentless
counterhegemonic maneuvering through which Black and Brown people
have ensured their survival, as well as their joy.
To attempt to reduce hip hop into any simple definition is to miss
important elements of it and diminish the experiential components that
comprise it. Since its emergence in the 1970s, hip hop has become more
than a set of musical and cultural practices. It is now a philosophical
approach, a radical politic, and an emancipatory project that profoundly
shapes global sounds, from India to the Caribbean, from Europe to Korea.
Hip hop now informs education, transforming antiblack pedagogical
models into a racially accessible set of practices. Moreover, hip hop, a
once hypermasculine and male dominated space, has come to be a site of
radical feminist praxis, including and celebrating the pleasure of Black
femininity itself. 28 A far cry from much of the gangsta rap of the 1990s
and 2000s, Black feminist hip hop pedagogies center female experience in
all its radiant and celebratory manifestations. As Aisha Durham, Brittney
Cooper, and Susana Morris write, “Newer studies in hip-hop feminism
focus not only on text-based cultural criticism but also increasingly on

24. Id. at 37-38.
25. I focus on antiblackness here but note that other groups have been harmed
by extractive racial capitalist practices and the overreliance on fair use as well.
See e.g. Madhavi Sunder, Bollywood/Hollywood, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN
LAW 275-308 (2011).
26. TRICIA ROSE, BLACK NOISE: RAP MUSIC AND BLACK CULTURE IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1994).
27. Id.
28. Joan Morgan, Why We Get Off: Moving Towards a Black Feminist Politics
of Pleasure, 45 The Black Scholar 36–46 (2015); Brittney Cooper & Treva Lindsey,
Love in a Time of Scandal, THE FEMINIST WIRE (2013), http://www.the
feministwire.com/2013/02/10180/ [https://perma.cc/Z5VL-KEGT].
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performative, ethnographic accounts that describe hip-hop as embodied,
lived culture.”29 They continue:
We see hip-hop feminism as a generationally specific articulation
of feminist consciousness, epistemology, and politics rooted in the
pioneering work of multiple generations of black feminists based
in the United States and elsewhere in the diaspora but focused on
questions and issues that grow out of the aesthetic and political
prerogatives of hip-hop culture. Thus, hip-hop feminism is
concerned with the ways the conservative backlash of the 1980s
and 1990s, deindustrialization, the slashing of the welfare state,
and the attendant gutting of social programs and affirmative
action, along with the increasing racial wealth gap, have affected
the lifeworlds and worldviews of the hip-hop generation. 30
In this sense, hip hop has progressed far beyond its original beginnings,
which were both brilliant and innovative in and of themselves, while
remaining true to their core. It is, more than ever, constitutive of a
spectrum of Blackness, lived praxis through which politics and pedagogies
are articulated and performed. Sampling, a central part of hip hop culture,
has become synonymous with signifyin’, which Henry Louis Gates
describes as a particularly African American manifestation of trickster
culture. 31 Recognizing the genius of hip hop, particularly through
monetary compensation, is the floor, not the ceiling, of antiracist praxis.
Doing so is necessary to normalizing Black brilliance instead of treating it
as exceptional or rare. This is a project of legibility as much as legality.
White scholars, lawyers, and judges must come to read Black brilliance,
including in the context of music, with the same generosity of spirit that
seems to mark their engagements with white “originality” and
“transformativeness.”

29. Aisha Durham, Brittney C. Cooper & Susana M. Morris, The Stage HipHop Feminism Built: A New Directions Essay, 38 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN
CULTURE AND SOCIETY 721–737 (2013).
30. Id. at 722.
31. HENRY LOUIS GATES, THE SIGNIFYING MONKEY: A THEORY OF
AFRICAN-AMERICAN LITERARY CRITICISM (1989), http://search.ebscohost.com/
login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=364423 [https://
perma.cc/BBA8-WXW4] (last visited Feb. 19, 2022).
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Recognizing and rewarding Black brilliance, a term with a long
history, 32 is not a practice that US jurists have excelled at. Quite the
contrary, American legal history is full of examples of moments of
violence against Black people and their creative contributions. Intellectual
property scholars and practitioners are at the forefront of engagement with
Black brilliance, as demonstrated by cases like Campbell. It is, therefore,
imperative that they understand copyright law, as well as its constitutive
category of “originality,” in Clair Spaulding, Jaminque Adams, Demaris
C. Dunn, and Bettina L. Love, a manner that is grounded in epistemologies
of Blackness. This is precisely what social media campaigns like
#BlackBoyJoy and #BlackGirlMagic aim to accomplish, defining Black
agency, confidence, and respect without reference to white meritocratic
and experiential yardsticks. This is necessary because US curricula are
“inextricably linked to centuries of conquering and domination.”33 As one
group of scholar educators, Elizabeth put it: “In antiracist schools,
educators see Black brilliance and center healing, healthy relationships,
histories and herstories that exhume and affirm Black joy.” 34
A trio of mathematics scholars – Erika Bullock, Maisie Gholson, and
Nathan Alexander – write in an essay on Black brilliance “we were
unprepared for the intense and insidious gravity of our own deficit
thinking, given we believed ourselves to be progressive thinkers,
promising scholars, and Black nonetheless.” 35 They challenge themselves
and the educators with whom they are in community to take Black
brilliance as “axiomatic” 36 and imagine how that might look. They
conclude that “[a]n axiomatic stance of brilliance transcends the offensive
position (e.g., proving Black children are brilliant) and defensive position
(e.g., refuting Black children’s illiteracy or inferiority) involved in framing
and forecloses on the endless cycle of proving Black children’s brilliance.
A new axiom of Black brilliance signals a new set of research questions
and a new approach…that [has] nothing to do with Black children’s
32. Adrienne Maree Brown, Ursula Le Guin’s Fiction as Inspiration for
Activism, 12 Ada New Media (2021), https://adanewmedia.org/2017/10/issue12brown/ [https://perma.cc/K7NF-B58D].
33. Justin A. Coles, “It’s Really Geniuses That Live in the Hood”: Black
Urban Youth Curricular Un/makings and Centering Blackness in Slavery’s
Afterlife, 51 CURRICULUM INQUIRY 36 (2021).
34. Clair Spaulding, Jaminque Adams, Demaris C. Dunn, and Bettina L.
Love, Freedom Dreaming Antiracist Pedagogy Dreams, 99 LANGUAGE ARTS 9
(September 2021).
35. Erika Bullock, Maisie Gholson & Nathan Alexander, On the Brilliance
of Black Children: A Response to a Clarion Call, E. C. 8 (2012).
36. Id.
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achievement, as their ability and potential is no longer in question.”37 Put
differently: “Under the axiom of brilliance, teachers and scholars start
from the assumption that students are highly capable, rather than
beginning with low expectations and forcing students to prove that they
can meet higher standards.” 38 Hip hop pedagogy is one tool that aids in the
project of reframing Black brilliance as epistemological given instead of a
dubious premise. One aim of this paper is to identify how certain legal
approaches are inconsistent with treating Black brilliance as axiomatic as
opposed to a hard won victory in the face of presumptions to the contrary.
Accordingly, it asks the reader to consider what it means to treat Black
brilliance as axiomatic, as opposed to a hard won victory in the face of
presumptions to the contrary, in the context of intellectual property,
specifically copyright law.
II. THE NOT SO PROMISED LAND OF FAIR USE
In their 2007 article “Everyone’s A Superhero: A Cultural Theory of
‘Mary Sue’ Fan Fiction as Fair Use,” Anupam Chander and Madhavi
Sunder make the case for the importance of remaking existing copyrighted
works in the service of anti-racist, anti-colonialist, and anti-misogynist
dialogue with hegemonic popular culture from the margins. Highlighting
the common fan fiction character of “Mary Sue,” a genre of female
character inserted into fan fiction and frequently critiqued for her
flawlessness, they “rehabilitate Mary Sue as a figure of subaltern critique
and, indeed, empowerment.” 39 They go on to explain why and how
rewriting well-known artistic works produces a counterhegemonic
conversation, frequently to the benefit of those who lack power and
authority. Their early defense of the social justice potential of fair use
contends that: 1) authors should not “cease and desist” in the creation of
fan fiction that may be protectable under fair use and 2) fair use ought to
be interpreted broadly, through the doctrine of “transformativeness.”40
Chander and Sunder develop what is now a familiar narrative through
discussion of parodic fair use in Campbell but also SunTrust Bank v.
37. Id. at 5-6.
38. Lisa DaVia Rubenstein, Charles B. Sandifer, and Robin Spoon,
Reimagining IDEA Using the Axiom of Black Brilliance, 103 KAPPAN 22 (March
2022).
39. Chander & Sunder, supra note 1 at 599; see also Betsy Rosenblatt and
Rebecca Tushnet, Transformative Works: Young Women’s Voices on Fandom and
Fair Use, in Putting Technology, Theory and Policy into Dialogue with Girls’ and
Young Women’s Voices 385-409 (Jane Bailey and Valerie Steeves eds, 2015).
40. Id. at 601.
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Houghton-Mifflin (2001), a high profile case that involved a copyright
infringement lawsuit that Margaret Mitchell’s estate initiated against
Black author and cultural critic Alice Randall. 41 Randall’s The Wind Done
Gone rewrote the classic piece of Americana, Gone with the Wind, from
the vantage point of the enslaved persons living on Tara. As such – and
much to the chagrin of Southern conservatives – the novel did considerable
work in retelling sentimental white nationalist histories and memories of
the antebellum period. A number of African American scholars and
activists, including Henry Louis Gates, Toni Morrison, and Lovalerie King
joined in praising Randall’s rewriting of the beloved literary work from
the vantage point of Scarlett O’Hara’s mixed race half-sister. 42 Ultimately,
after the district court lamented the destruction of O’Hara’s character and
the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on their
claim for injunctive relief, 43 the parties settled. The settlement allowed
publication of the book, presumably based on the doctrine of
transformativeness, but resulted in it being classified as a parody. 44 This
case, alongside Campbell, seemed to illustrate the potential for authors and
artists to use “transformativeness” to cast a wide net with respect to
remaking popular cultural texts.
Chander and Sunder make a compelling argument that fair use serves
a necessary counterhegemonic function, i.e. it provides a mechanism
through which authors and artists can speak back to cultural productions
via existing characters and stories. However, over 25 years after Campbell
and 20 years after SunTrust Bank, the limitations of fair use and
transformativeness have become apparent. Courts have not universally
embraced either wholeheartedly. Copyright remains a site of myriad fair
use struggles – over access to knowledge, semiotic democracy, racial
equity, and (post)colonial liberation – in which (white) industrial
capitalists seem to continue to have the upper hand. 45 I would go so far as
to argue that judicial approaches to fair use produce a category of second
class creatorial citizenship, that trades on exceptions. Even Neil
Weinstock Netanel in a defense of fair use’s predictability reported:
41. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
42. Henry Louis Gates, 2 Live Crew, Decoded, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1990,
at 23; Toni Morrison, Decl. at 1; SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F.
Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001); LOVALERIE KING, RACE, THEFT, AND ETHICS:
PROPERTY MATTERS IN AFRICAN AMERICAN LITERATURE (2007).
43. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 at 1276-1277.
44. Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of the Press, “Wind Done Gone”
Copyright Case Settled (May 29, 2002), https://www.rcfp.org/wind-done-gonecopyright-case-settled/ [https://perma.cc/7YVF-F9BC].
45. See e.g. Rosenblatt, supra note 15.

78

LSU LAW JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE & POLICY

[Vol. I & II

“[n]umerous scholars have lambasted fair use doctrine. That includes
me.” 46 Among the critics of fair use’s efficacy and predictability are
intellectual property giants Lawrence Lessig and Barton Beebe. 47 Lessig,
for instance, famously declared “I hate fair use. I hate it because it distracts
us from free use,”48 apparently leading the way in turning a considerable
portion of a generation off to its possibilities. As Aram Sinnreich, Patricia
Aufderheide, Maggie Clifford, and Saif Shahin maintain “many people
who became familiar with fair use in the early aughts may have considered
it as a hindrance to utopian goals.”49 Nonetheless, many progressive
intellectual property scholars continue to seek to rehabilitate fair use as a
necessary and useful tool for challenging overbroad copyright
enforcement. This essay is a thought experiment in divesting from that
project in favor of more robust, less equivocal claims to creatorship and
(intellectual) property. 50
Some might wonder why an article critiquing fair use as a tool of racial
justice is necessary when so few scholars and activists make the explicit
case for using the affirmative defense. From where I sit, the reason is
structural. Continuing to put faith in fair use to support artists of color
diminishes the value of their artistic works as standalone products of
brilliance, especially given that fair use still tends to disproportionately
benefit corporate entities over individual ones. Rosenblatt writes that “the
framework of fair use is not a free-for-all.” 51 I build on this observation
about the limitations of fair use by showing how its mere rhetorical
invocation can operate as a tool of racial and (post)colonial domination
and distraction. At the heart of this claim are two arguments: that intensely
focusing on fair use suggests that it can solve more problems of selfexpression than it actually can, particularly vis-à-vis race, and that it is
more than a fantasy script for creators of color. Embracing fair use as a
concept without attending to its potentially detrimental impacts on cultural
understandings of Black brilliance may indeed create more problems for
the long term protection of innovative artistic works than it solves.
46. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 715, 715 (2011).
47. Id. at 716-717.
48. See e.g. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE:
HOW TO PUT BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT 66 (2011).
49. Aram Sinnreich et al., Access Shrugged: The Decline of the Copyleft and
the Rise of Utilitarian Openness, 23 NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY 3466, 3481 (2021).
50. Some of its most ardent supporters include Peter Jaszi and Pamela
Samuelson. See e.g. AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 48.
51. Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Fair Use as Resistance, 9 UC IRVINE L. REV.
377, 390 (2018).
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Rosenblatt’s Bakhtinian reading of fair use gets at some of the implicit
hierarchy established by fair use, e.g. that “an ‘original’ creator gets not
only enhanced rights, but also enhanced stability.”52 David
Hesmondhalgh’s examination of Moby’s Play, an album sonically marked
by the sampling of audio recordings collected by folklorist Alan Lomax,
suggests a similar argument in , highlighting how fair use necessarily cuts
both ways by making it easier for white musicians to engage in sampling. 53
A CRTIP approach to thinking about fair use can sharpen conversations
around copyright and infringement, as well as advance goals of racial
justice. Such an approach also likely requires divesting from the doctrine
and its remedial tendencies in favor of more radical interventions that
center epistemologically inclusive notions of protectability, originality,
and infringement. .
Racial injustice in the music industry, as Rosenblatt demonstrates with
precision in her recent work, is distinct from fair use in other contexts,
partly because hip hop itself is so closely associated with Blackness.54
Copyright law, as a tool of enforcing antiblack racism and exploitation, is
part of what Michel Foucault would call a “racial episteme,” 55 i.e. a
framework through which race is constructed and imagined in America.
Countless scholars have traced many ways that Black people have been
structurally excluded from copyright law, including: racialized
citizenship, 56 musical segregation, 57 problematic (white) co-authorship,58

52. Id. at 394.
53. Hesmondhalgh, supra note 17.
54. Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Social Justice and Copyright’s Excess, 6 TEX.
A&M J. PROP. L. 5–22 (2020).
55. See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
Writings, 1972-1977 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980).
56. See e.g. ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (1998); ANJALI VATS,
THE COLOR OF CREATORSHIP: RACE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICANS (2020). The conversation about the role of citizenship in
intellectual property law extends far beyond race, as in Jessica Silbey, The
Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319
(2007).
57. Greene, supra note 18 at 1189.
58. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Musical
Copyright, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L J. 573 (2009); see also Hesmondhalgh,
supra note 17.
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unequal contracts, 59 property theft, 60 and legal exclusion. 61 Matthew
Morrison goes back a step further to contend that the architecture of
copyright law itself was built through the legal and performative
dispossession of Black artists, through a practice, epistemology, and
hermeneutic he calls “Blacksound”. As he writes, “mostly white music
industrialists capitalized upon the (unrecognized) performance property of
black Americans, both in and out of blackface…this process helped to
define and liberate imagined visions of whiteness through black popular
aesthetics scripted into sheet music and other tangible forms subject to
legal protection.” 62 He shows, through meticulously assembled historical
evidence, that certain particularities of the copyright regime, e.g. the nonprotection of sound recordings until the 1970s, emerged from the need and
desire of sheet music publishers and music producers to commodify Black
music, in appropriative ways that were palatable to white people.
The consistency with which copyright law has been mobilized against
people of color, particularly Black people, as a disciplinary and extractive
mechanism, as well as the conservativeness with which courts have used
it as a liberatory tool suggest the need for a critique of the white liberalism
underlying fair use. I want to highlight three major ways that fair use
hinders racial justice instead of facilitating progress toward it. These three
arguments draw on the critiques of facial race neutrality that Critical Race
Theory scholars such Derrick Bell, Cheryl Harris, and Kimberlé Crenshaw
have made, as applied to intellectual property in the growing area of
Critical Race Intellectual Property (“CRTIP”). 63 In essence, they point to
how even laws that appear equal at first glance can elide the histories of
whiteness that led to their creation in the first place and their disparate
impacts on people of color. 64 From this vantage point, fair use in all its
applications can be read as a minimally remedial means of addressing the

59. Id.
60. King, supra note 42 at 2.
61. Brian L. Frye, Invention of a Slave, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 181 (2018);
Kara W. Swanson, Race and Selective Legal Memory: Reflections on Invention of
a Slave, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1077 (2020).
62. Matthew D. Morrison, Race, Blacksound, and the (Re)Making of
Musicological Discourse, 72 J. OF THE AM. MUSICOLOGICAL SOCIETY 781–823,
793 (2019).
63. Anjali Vats & Deidre Keller, Critical Race IP, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 735 (2018).
64. See generally Derrick A. Jr Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1979). Bell posits that
racial progress only occurs when it is in the interests of white people.
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minimization of Black brilliance instead of a path to racial justice.65 First,
the commitment to fair use is embedded within the very strand of white
liberal reformism that critical race theorists such as Bell critique, as
opposed to a full embrace of Black humanity and Black epistemologies.
Second, judges, steeped in Lockean understandings of (intellectual)
property rights, have developed a narrow view of “transformativeness”
that reinforces racially exclusionary notions of authorship and innovation,
i.e. property rights vest in the “original” but rarely the “copy”. Finally, fair
use is structurally constructed as a post facto rejoinder, an affirmative
defense in the face of claims of copyright infringement. This leaves the
power to frame the conversation in the hands of more powerful actors. As
I will demonstrate in the last section, contesting the very purpose of the
Copyright Act of 1976, by recontextualizing the arguments made by the
Framers of the Constitution through the lens of CRTIP is a preferable
alternative to undoing the racial harms of copyright law than continuing to
invest in the doctrine of fair use.
To say that the desire to defend fair use reflects white liberalism is to
draw on the work of ardent critics of Euro-American political theory, such
as Charles Mills. Mills uses the term “racial contract”66 to describe the
tacit political and civic agreement in Euro-American nations to center,
value, and reward whiteness. This argument is a more philosophically
grounded version of CRT’s critiques of white liberalism, that focuses on
the organization of civil society under Western rights based modes of
governance. Cheryl Harris, for instance, explains that “[w]hiteness as
property has taken on more subtle forms, but retains its core characteristic
– the legal legitimation of expectations of power and control that enshrine
the status quo as a neutral baseline, while masking the maintenance of
white privilege and domination.”67 She makes this argument by tracing
how property and whiteness have coevolved since Emancipation, in the
service of white supremacy. The same argument can be made of fair use,
a doctrine that subordinates Black brilliance to the whims of a white
supremacist copyright system and a federal judiciary that reflects EuroAmerican notions of race and creatorship. Just as the shift from US
practices of chattel slavery to claims of reverse racism allowed white
people to maintain property rights in whiteness itself, the shift from US
practices of formal exclusion to claims of outright theft allowed white
65. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 1049–1120 (1977). Freeman calls this the “perpetrator perspective.”
66. Charles W. Mills, Racial Liberalism, 123 PMLA 1380–1397 (2008).
67. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1717
(1993).
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people to maintain intellectual property rights in whiteness itself. For
instance, Grand Upright Music makes implicit claims of “theft” based on
the premise that, by virtue of their whiteness, musicians such as Gilbert
O’Sullivan are entitled to a broad swath of copyright protection that
extends to any use of their music. As countless historians of music and
copyright have shown, this presumption does not cut both ways, as the
work of Black musicians was not treated with equal ownership and
dignity. That Grand Upright Music was the first attempt to criminalize
sampling, a mundane and common practice in the music industry,
illustrates the evolution of the racial politics that led to the restructuring of
whiteness as intellectual property.
Harris contends that whiteness has evolved from color to race to status
property, through property law and antidiscrimination law. She traces this
evolution to Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857), in which the Supreme Court
maintained that affording Dred Scott the privileges of whiteness would
diminish the value of that identity. As she puts it, “[b]eing regarded as
white, or the reputation of whiteness, represents a blending of the concepts
of reputation as honor – that which is claimed by virtue of status – and
reputation as property – that which has value in the market.” 68 This same
process, i.e. the blending of reputation, property, and value, is evident in
the conversations around hip hop in the 1990s and 2000s. 69 Acuff-Rose,
for instance, in suing 2 Live Crew, argued that the parody’s lyrics were
“disparaging and therefore not consistent with maintaining the value of the
copyright.” 70 This comment, seemingly made in the context of the fourth
factor of the fair use test, is an example of a company attempting to
expansively read the purpose of copyright law as a tool for protecting
reputation as “value,” when the Constitution and Supreme Court have
repeatedly stated otherwise. On the one hand, Acuff-Rose’s claim is
understandable given the emphasis that creators seem to place on
reputation even though intellectual property law rarely protects it. 71 On the
other hand, the extent to which Blackness is articulated as a “threat” to
reputation is troubling and merits attention.
68. Id. at 1747.
69. For a discussion of trademark dilution as an attempt to maintain whiteness
as status property, see Richard Schur, Legal Fictions: Trademark Discourse and
Race, in AFRICAN AMERICAN CULTURE AND LEGAL DISCOURSE 191–207
(Lovalerie King & Richard L. Schur eds., 2009).
70. Laurie Asseo, 2 Live Crew’s Parody of Orbison is Key to Copyright
Dispute, AP News (March 29, 1993), https://apnews.com/article/6a1251feb70
71269dee5450fe2c39b32 [https://perma.cc/5CL5-6375].
71. JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND
EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015), 140.

2022]

THE RACIAL POLITICS OF FAIR USE FETISHISM

83

Moreover, while the quote does not clarify why or how “Pretty
Woman” is disparaging, read in the context of contemporaneous
conversations about the obscenity of 2 Live Crew’s work, it is apparent
that race played a central role in Acuff-Rose’s rhetorical construction of
the song as vulgar. Race and hip hop were simply too intertwined in the
“rhetorical culture” 72 of the moment to read the effects of this comment,
even if well-intentioned, as harmless. Marcus Johnson and Ralina Joseph
illustrate this in their analysis of Crenshaw’s famous essay on the
“obscenity” and misogyny of 2 Live Crew:
“Crenshaw takes issue with the prosecution’s racialized biases in
categorizing what qualifies or does not qualify as
obscene…Crenshaw draws attention to a Newsweek article written
by journalist George Will condemning 2 Live Crew’s disregard
for Black women; in the article Will conjures images of the
Central Park Jogger and concerns about smoking cigarettes
receiving more attention than 2 Live Crew’s lewd lyrics about
Black women. This sleight of hand…removes Black women from
view and replaces them with images…of a white woman. It is with
this move that the stereotype of the Black hyper-sexualized and
violent ‘super predator’…emerges…In the end, Crenshaw
determines that the obscenity case against 2 Live Crew was never
about being sexually explicit, but about being Black.”73
This is all to say that even if Acuff-Rose did not intend to raise the
specter of race via its disparagement claims, it invariably did. The
publishing firm not only centered the value of the “original,” i.e. Orbison’s
“Oh, Pretty Woman,” and thus the value of whiteness, but also asserted
the need for the “protection” of a white man’s creative work from the
remixes of obscene Black men.74 In this sense, Campbell, a case so often
72. Marouf Hasian, Jr., Michelle C. Condit & John Luis Lucaites, The
Rhetorical Boundaries of “The Law”: A Consideration of the Rhetorical Culture
of Legal Practice and the Case of the “Separate but Equal” Doctrine, 82
QUARTERLY J. OF SPEECH 323–342 (1996) (in using this term, Hasian et al. “mean
to draw attention to the range of linguistic usages available to those who would
address a historically particular audience as a public.) Id. at 326. The rhetorical
culture in the moment Campbell was decided linked race and criminality.
73. Marcus Johnson & Ralina L Joseph, Black Cultural Studies is
Intersectionality, 23 INT'L J. OF CULTURAL STUDIES 833–839 (2020).
74. For a recent critique of double standards with respect to originality, see
generally Rosenblatt, supra note 29; see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright
on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and Bess, and Unfair Use, 37
RUTGERS L.J. 277–354 (2005). Arewa’s analysis alerts the reader to the reality
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lauded for its progressive vision of copyright, only made an incremental
move within a larger system of racial liberalism. That incremental move
had some positive effects but failed to support broader inclusivity goals.
Instead, as evidenced by jurisprudence around fair use and
transformativeness, those positive effects were limited by the narrowness
of the holding and constrained by the expansive culture of white “racial
plagiarism” 75 in music.
Mills and Harris lay the groundwork for thinking about how fair use
perpetuates racist notions of “transformativeness.” The Court in Campbell
defined parody narrowly, as commentary on a specific text, person, or
work, in opposition to satire, or commentary on culture writ large. At the
time Campbell was decided, this was true across the board. Rogers v.
Koons (1992), for instance, provided an example of the judicial refusal to
extend fair use of satire to a white visual artist. 76 Yet two cases involving
sampling in the context of visual art, Blanch v. Koons (2006) and Cariou
v. Prince (2013), 77 seemed to afford white artists fair use and
transformativeness latitude that was not extended to artists of color in the
context of music. 78 Excitement about the possibilities of these cases

that fair use is available to white people even as a tacit norm but to Black people
only if they create “transformative” work, as defined by white people. These are
two of many examples of this originality double standard.
75. Minh-Ha T. Pham, Racial Plagiarism and Fashion, 4 QED: A J. IN
GLBTQ WORLDMAKING 67–80 (2017) (Pham uses this term to add nuance to
cultural appropriation and copyright infringement claims. She writes:
Racial plagiarism highlights the racial relationships and inequalities that
are obscured by terms like cultural appropriation, cultural appreciation,
and piracy. In the fashion context, racial plagiarism occurs when a
designer copies racial and indigenous styles, forms, practices, and
knowledges without permission and without giving adequate (or any)
attribution to the source model and community. As with other
plagiarisms, racial plagiarism covers verbatim copying (or in fashion
terms, the line-by-line copying of a racially marked garment) and
unacknowledged paraphrasing (a reworked but still recognizable
derivative model). Id. at 69.
76. See generally Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
77. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d
694 (2d Cir. 2013).
78. Richard Chused, Brief Thoughts on Fair Use and Third-Party Harm:
Another Reappraisal of Patrick Cariou v. Richard Prince, 67 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 103–120 (2019) (observing this racially problematic fair use claim
Prince made and that the court ultimately found to be transformative:
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revitalizing fair use embraces the well-intentioned but problematic
progressive fantasy that I critique here, by eliding the larger structural
realities of racial inequity in copyright law.79 While these cases may
suggest some liberalization of fair use, they also highlight how
transformativeness disparately benefits white men, in the former example
in appropriating the photography of a white photographer and in the latter
example in appropriating images of non-consenting Rastafarians. 80
Despite conceding that he made only “minimal alterations” 81 to Cariou’s
work, the Second Circuit deemed his work to be “an entirely different
aesthetic from Cariou’s photographs.” 82 This is a far cry from Judge
Duffy’s scolding in Grand Upright Music but not one that has measurably
benefitted Black musicians. Moreover, it suggests a variation on Lockean
labor analysis that privileges the creativity of white artists and musicians,
such as Gilbert O’Sullivan and Richard Prince, despite sometimes minimal
efforts, and diminishes the humanity of Black artists. In both cases, the
originality and weightiness of the artistic works produced by these men,
in the “original” in O’Sullivan’s case and the “remix” in Prince’s case, was
deemed to create an entitlement to intellectual property rights. The sweat
of the brain, so to speak, originates from what the Second Circuit perceives
to be the innovativeness of the artistic works. The court’s conception of
transformativeness so deeply centers the artistic expression of Prince that
it misses the context of the piece. Chused explains that the
“transformation” in which Prince engaged was offensive, even
Patrick Cariou befriended a largely isolated community of rural
Jamaican Rastafarians, spent a great deal of time with them over a period
of six years, "gained their trust, took an array of pictures with the consent
of the community, and placed many of his austere, beautiful images in
the 2000 volume YES RASTA." Richard Prince made copies of a
number of images from the book, tore portions-mostly people-of some
of the photographs from the compositions, blew up the torn out segments
to very large sizes, placed them on an array of canvases, and interspersed
them with blotches of color, musical instruments, or images of nude,
often white, women. The canvases became part of Prince's Canal Zone
series. Id. at 110.
79. See e.g. Julian Azran, Bring Back the Noise: How Cariou v. Prince Will
Revitalize Sampling, 38 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 69 (2014). Azran’s optimism at
Cariou is understandable. However, six years since the publication of the essay
and seven years since Cariou was decided, the case’s progressive potential
appears limited.
80. Chused, supra note 78.
81. Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 at 711.
82. Id.
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sacrilegious. He concludes that it is “wildly inappropriate to think of
Prince’s work as anything like uses of preexisting copyrighted materials
traditionally labeled as fair: historic commentary, aesthetic criticism,
educational instruction or parody.” 83 Indeed, Prince takes images that were
never his to take and imposes his whiteness upon them, functionally
exploiting and (re)colonizing a group of people that have never writ large
benefitted from fair use. His reuse is thus qualitatively different from that
of 2 Live Crew. Dehumanizing and distasteful expressions are
distinguishable, particularly in the context of transformative works. The
extractive form to which Cariou reduces fair use cannot be the basis of a
racially emancipatory politic.
Perhaps predictably given existing sample licensing laws and racist
double standards, as Lee’s empirical study of fair use in musical
infringement cases demonstrates, courts have decided no cases involving
non-parodic copying and fair use since Campbell. Lee makes two
observations: 1) at best, only one federal court has recognized non-parodic
musical copying to be fair use,84 and 2) very few musical infringement
cases have involved discussions of fair use. 85 Still, he contends that the
possibility for “copyright clutter,”86 i.e. the functional occupation of
musical material through ownership, requires (re)turning to fair use. While
Lee makes a compelling case that fair use is theoretically helpful to
musicians and ought to be used more frequently, these recommendations
do not take into account racial justice – or the long gap during which artists
were not offered a path for making winnable fair use claims. At best,
asking Black artists to create work under the presumption of fair use,
without licensing samples, creates unreasonable liability. At worst, it
adopts a questionable ethical orientation toward historically oppressed
groups. Black people would bear the risk of asserting fair use, as in
Campbell, but with over two decades of silence that suggests, by mere
omission, that it is not a workable defense in the face of existing licensing
requirements. Lee’s argument may very well be persuasive from a
copyright clutter perspective. However, the risk involved in combatting
copyright clutter, especially for Black artists, is unreasonable.
This is in part because fair use is a post facto rejoinder, an affirmative
defense in the face of claims of copyright infringement. The concept of
83. Chused, supra note 78 at 116.
84. Lee says at best because the copyright infringement claim at issue was
directed at Drake’s “Jimmy Smith Rap,” which Lee argues does not definitively
constitute an example of musical copying. Edward Lee, Fair Use Avoidance in
Music Cases, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1873–1932 (2018).
85. Id.
86. Id.

2022]

THE RACIAL POLITICS OF FAIR USE FETISHISM

87

fair use as affirmative defense can be traced back to Folsom v. Marsh
(1841), 87 in which Judge Story named the concept for the first time.
Though Lydia Pallas Loren contends that fair use should not be treated as
an affirmative defense, 88 there is little evidence that her suggested
approach has gained traction in courts. As a representational matter,
Invoking the fair use defense in copyright proceedings is racially
problematic because it reinforces stereotypical understandings of Black
people as inherently criminal, insofar as they are conceding infringement,
and it perpetuates a copyright system that was built around the financial
gains of white people at the expense of people of color.
Lovalerie King demonstrates how Black people in America are
presumed to be thieves, even when their own labor is necessary to produce
purportedly “stolen” objects. 89 Fair use normalizes that presumption, by
forcing Black musicians into a context in which they must admit to the
“crime” of copying in order to subsequently defend themselves. As a racial
presumption, this is troubling and leaves rhetorical space for journalists to
report on cases in ways that replicate all too prevalent stereotypes about
race. Fair use accepts the overarching framework of copyright
infringement, even though it was produced through an epistemology of
racial exploitation. Morrison “interrogates assumptions about the aesthetic
legacy of blackface vis-à-vis notions of intellectual (performance)
property and considers the ontological basis of property and identity that
developed out of the aesthetics of racialized performances.” 90 This
argument about copyright law’s origins in the desire for white industrial
capitalists, such as sheet music owners and record company executives, as
a tool to make money from the aesthetic innovations of Black people is an
indictment of the legal regime itself. Fair use claims concede the
epistemological racism of the copyright system while, in essence, asking
for reprieve for particular instances of copying. They are also, by
definition, ad hoc.
These racial problematics are amplified by the chilling effects of fair
use. Deidre Keller and I have written about some of these in the context of
education, in response to Jaszi. We note that copyright litigation is almost
always expensive and copyright attorneys are almost always a risk averse
lot. Relying on fair use to solve the problems of an overexpansive

87. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
88. Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense Symposium:
Campbell at 21, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685–712 (2015).
89. King, supra note 42.
90. Morrison, supra note 62.
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copyright statute will necessarily result in at least some self-censorship. 91
These reasons, read in the aggregate, alongside strict liability and even de
minimis approaches to copying, raise considerable questions about the
ability of fair use to account for the full spectrum of Black brilliance and,
indeed, serve racial justice goals at all, except in outlier cases. This
conception of Black brilliance is necessarily exceptionalist, in a way that
minimizes the work of Black artists. 92 Forcing Black people into
frameworks in which they must defensively prove the reality of their
brilliance is epistemologically violent and artistically disrespectful. As I
will demonstrate in the last section, conceptualizing a purpose to copyright
law that can embrace not only Black brilliance, but also Brown and
Indigenous brilliance is an important first step toward racial equity.
III. REIMAGINING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF RACE AND FAIR USE
THROUGH PURPOSE

One question that law professors and lawyers tend to ask in the face
of critiques of racial liberalism such as the one that I have offered here is
“so what?” Legal and policy alternatives are the currency of the legal
world, which does not often speak the language of epistemological critique
or performative intervention. I often hesitate to offer legal and policy
alternatives precisely because they can diminish the power of critique, by
suggesting that the pragmatic can achieve the idealistic. Given the
audience here, I will offer one concrete alternative: shift the site of racial
contestation in copyright infringement cases from fair use to the Copyright
Act. Given the results of Lee’s empirical study, this has little cost, except
perhaps to diminish the value of continuing conversations about
reclaiming fair use in the context of music. Two essays, “Social Justice
and Copyright’s Excess” by Elizabeth Rosenblatt, and “Et Tu, Fair Use?”
by Jonathan Tehranian, provide starting points for this argument, as well
as articulate persuasive critiques of the Supreme Court’s increasingly
expansionist “natural law” 93 approach to thinking about copyright law’s
purpose. The argument in this essay, however, requires thinking beyond
both of them, through the lens of critical race studies. I believe this is a
more fruitful place to invest racial justice energy than contemplating the
minutiae of judicial turns toward more expansive fair use policies. It is
91. Deidré A Keller & Anjali S Vats, Centering Education in the Next Great
Copyright Act: A Response to Professor Jaszi, 54 DUQUESNE L. REV. 23 (2016).
92. Vats & Keller, supra note 63.
93. John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law
Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465.
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also consistent with the advice that Jane C. Ginsberg offers to “rebalance
the factors” 94 of fair use. The rest of the essay, then, imagines what it might
look like to reframe the purpose of the Copyright Act of 1976, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, with an orientation toward antiracist
and anticolonial praxis. Treating Black brilliance as axiomatic in copyright
infringement cases is an approach to doing so, as is centering Black
understandings of authorship.
In Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984), The
Supreme Court has articulated the purpose of the Copyright Act of 1976
as:
“defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be
granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public
appropriate access to their work product. Because this task
involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and
discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in
the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other
hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended
repeatedly.” 95
This purpose may result in “a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for
the general public good.” 96 The articulation of purpose is, of course, based
on the Constitution itself, which states that the goal of copyright is “[t]o
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.”97 The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this
purpose repeatedly over the years, sometimes also embracing curiously
broad copyright protection while doing so. 98 In addition to raising
inevitable questions about the length and scope of the copyright monopoly,
this purpose invokes an imagined author. Based on the fair use cases
discussed here, it is reasonable to conclude that the Copyright Act
embraces the epistemological standpoint of the white author. The terms
“progress” and “useful arts, for instance, are circumscribed by race, insofar
94. Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use in the United States: Transformed, Deformed,
Reformed?, SINGAPORE J. OF LEGAL STUDIES (2020).
95. Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 430
(1984).
96. Id. at 432.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
98. See e.g. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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as they are defined through particular sets of cultural norms. Similarly,
“artistic creativity” is a term that is defined through a racial episteme that
minimized the artistic and creative capacity of all people of color,
particularly Black people. Decentering that whiteness requires
conceptualizing both of these terms from the position of racial difference.
Tehranian’s critique is helpful for thinking about fair use’s
relationship to the racialization and whitewashing of authorship as well as
the purpose of the Copyright Act. Through a legal history of the antimonopolistic goals of copyright law, he maintains that historic
overreliance on fair use has actually led to overexpansive intellectual
property rights by making problematic assumptions about the value of
copyrighted works as property. 99 The critiques, of course, are the same
ones that, read through a CRT lens, normalize the value of white creativity
while simultaneously minimizing the value of people of color’s creativity.
This cannot produce intellectual property equity. He writes:
“Far from protecting the public domain, the fair use doctrine has
played a central role in the triumph of a natural-law vision of
copyright that privileges the inherent property interests of authors
in the fruits of their labor over the utilitarian goal of progress in
the arts. Thus, the fair use doctrine has actually enabled the
expansion of the copyright monopoly well beyond its original
bounds and has undermined the goals of the copyright system as
envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution.” 100
The critique of natural law justifications of copyright law pushes against
the treatment of whiteness as intellectual property by questioning the
extent to which authors are entitled to a compensation enhancing
monopoly. As Tehranian puts it, Justice Story’s articulation of fair use in
Folsom “set into motion a striking departure from this original heuristic
[that no interdiction precluded transformative uses of a protected work] by
reintroducing long-spurned natural-law elements into the copyright
calculus.” 101 Far from accepting transformativeness as a panacea for all
that ails copyright law, he notes that early U.S. jurisprudence treated works
that built upon existing works as fundamentally “accretive” 102 and thus
valuable. Returning to this concept of accretiveness can create legal and
rhetorical possibilities for centering people of color in arguments about

99.
100.
101.
102.

See generally Tehranian, supra note 93.
Id. at 466.
Id.
Id.
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copyright law’s purpose. Indeed, Black musical innovation, even if it
samples, is only not accretive through the lens of whiteness. 103
Rosenblatt reiterates the legal fact that “copyright ‘progress’ is about
promoting authorship, as opposed to (for example) providing morally
appropriate compensation for labor, vindicating the personal connections
between authors and their works, or promoting broad social justice.” 104
From there, she makes the case that the “progress” part of the Copyright
Act makes investment in social justice essential, not extraneous, to
copyright law. She writes:
One might argue that many of these considerations fall outside
copyright’s explicit priorities…I suggest that even within the
narrow instrumentalist vision of copyright, a more complex
definition of “progress” that takes into account authors’ wellbeing and diversity reflects a more complete version of the
“progress” that copyright should (but may not) serve…Promoting
diversity in authorship – that is, promoting the creation of works
by the widest possible array of authors – doubtlessly promotes the
creation of more works, not to mention more diverse works. And
perhaps more importantly, if we think that promoting well-being
and diversity among authors would not promote progress, we
should rethink our concept of progress. 105
Rosenblatt articulates the need to emphasize purpose and progress as
broad and inclusive concepts, reflective of the decolonial and post#BlackLivesMatter moment in which we live. Even this shift, the one from
treating social justice as incidental to essential to copyright law, can pay
tremendous dividends for people of color. Moreover, it forces ethical
confrontation with the consistent refusal of copyright law to recognize the
creatorial personhood of Black people. 106
To treat Black music as central to the accretive purpose of the
Copyright Act is to decenter whiteness as the benchmark for (intellectual)
property and originality. Starting from the presumption that Black music
is valuable, a fact that has been proven time and time again by white
103. Independent of this, as Jessica Silbey’s interview research has shown,
copyright law consistently fails to meet the needs of creators themselves, by
misunderstanding the authorial task and privileging corporate owners. Silbey,
supra note 71.
104. Rosenblatt, supra note 51 at 11.
105. Id. at 11-12.
106. Vats & Keller, supra note 63 (arguing that people of color are denied
status as persons for purposes of copyright).
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appropriation of Black musical traditions, is to take Black brilliance as
axiomatic. Indeed, imagining how Grand Upright Music may have
unfolded in a world in which the judge treated Biz Markie’s work as per
se innovative demonstrates how centering purpose over fair use shifts the
burden of proof in the case. When Black brilliance is treated as axiomatic,
it is incumbent upon the party alleging copyright infringement to
demonstrate that the work in question does not contribute to the wealth of
artistry in the world, that there is some reason to place it, as Rosenblatt
would contend, in a hierarchy below the work of the often white creator. 107
This reframing of the copyright conversation through the concept of
purpose, I would contend, offers radical possibilities for embracing an
array of artistic works, made by Black, Brown, and Indigenous musicians
from a starting point other than a hermeneutics of suspicion. Under such a
framework, infringement would become secondary to accretion, with
attention to actual harm, present and historical. Indeed, each of these
groups has faced struggles over racial plagiarism as well as the devaluation
of their own artistic works and creative processes. I do not profess to lay
out a blueprint for treating Black brilliance as axiomatic. I believe,
however, that radicalizing the purpose of the Copyright Act through the
rhetoric of accretion provides an important and novel alternative to fair use
for making antiracist progress in the context of copyright law. Moreover,
while this essay has focused on antiblack racism in the context of music,
the arguments have broader applicability. Not only do they provide
insights into how other people of color are excluded from equal access to
copyright law, they also create possibilities for rethinking the colonial
implications of fair use. These conversations, as scholars like Chander,
Sunder, Greene, Rosenblatt, and others show, are the future of copyright.

107. Rosenblatt, supra note 51.

